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Abstract 
This paper argues that the distinction between public and private standards only make sense if one 
looks at the legal status of specific standard-setting organisations. If one switches the unit of analysis 
the distinction between public and private begins to blur and fade. In this context, two different unit of 
analysis are analyzed. One unit of analysis focuses on specific standards, while another unit of 
analysis looks at a more aggregated level and analyzes broader ‘public’ regulatory approaches in 
which private standards are embedded. Concerning the former, the paper shows that private standards 
are often based on internationally agreed (public) rules and norms. Concerning the latter, the paper 
argues that governments on purpose or in the design of their policies take these private initiatives on 
board. Hence, they become an integral part of ‘public’ governance. These arguments are developed on 
the basis of an analysis of Voluntary Sustainability Standards which constitute a leading example of 
so-called private standards. The paper first introduces the emergence, proliferation and importance of 
VSS. Next, the paper assesses how private standards in VSS. Next, the attention turns to the link 
between public policy and VSS. The paper ends with a conclusion. 
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 1 
Introduction* 
Every October the world celebrates ‘standards day’. This day, organized by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), intends to pay tribute to the role voluntary standards play in 
society. In 2014 standards day was devoted to ‘levelling the playing field’ and underlined the 
importance of international standards to stimulate trade. Obviously, standards can also constitute 
barriers to trade and distort the playing the field. Either way, standards increasingly play an important 
role in economic relations (Busch, 2011). For example, in South Korea, one of the most spectacular 
examples of post-war economic development and industrialization, the number of standards governing 
and regulating industry has increased exponentially. The Korean Agency for Technology and 
Standards (KATS), the main body for developing standards, developed 300 standards by 1962. This 
increased to 8552 in 1990 and 23923 in 2011. (Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2013) 
However, not only technical standards stipulating products requirements or interoperability 
requirements are being developed but also standards on a whole range of issues such as, quality 
management standards to organize management, environmental management standards to reduce 
environmental impacts, health and safety standards to reduce accidents in the workplace, food safety 
standards to prevent food from being contaminated, energy management standards to cut energy 
consumption and human rights and labor standards. These standards are developed by a diverse set of 
actors ranging from governmental and intergovernmental organizations to individual firms and NGOs. 
In their ‘governance triangle’ Abbott and Snidal (2009) identified three main actors in transnational 
regulatory standard-setting activities. They subdivide the standard-setting initiatives on the basis of the 
actors involved in standard-setting process. They distinguish between three major actors, the state, 
firms and non-governmental organisations. These three actors form the ‘governance triangle’. Within 
this triangle, they distinguish seven zones, depending on how many parties are involved in the 
standard-setting process. Three zones contain initiatives in which one party (either state, firm or NGO) 
develops the standards, three zones contain initiatives in which a combination of two parties develop 
standards, and one zone contains standard-setting initiatives which are developed by the three parties. 
This classification makes already clear that not only states are involved in setting standards, but 
also non-state actors. ‘Private’ actors are increasingly developing and enforcing standards. This 
distinction between public and private in terms of who sets the standards can have important 
implications. As Mavroidis and Wolfe (this volume) point out in the context of the WTO it makes a 
significant difference of whether standards are ‘private’ or ‘public’ in terms of the applicability of 
WTO law. Public standards fall under WTO, while ‘private’ standards do not. However, how sensible 
is this distinction between public and private?  
This paper argues that the distinction between public and private only make sense if one looks at 
the legal status of specific standard-setting organisations. If one switches the unit of analysis the 
distinction between public and private begins to blur and fade. In this context, two different unit of 
analysis are of importance. One unit of analysis focuses on specific standards, while another unit of 
analysis looks at a more aggregated level and analyzes broader ‘public’ regulatory approaches in 
which private standards are embedded. Concerning the former, the paper shows that private standards 
are often based on internationally agreed (public) rules and norms. Concerning the latter, the paper 
argues that governments on purpose or in the design of their policies take these private initiatives on 
board. Hence, they become an integral part of ‘public’ governance. These arguments are developed on 
the basis of an analysis of Voluntary Sustainability Standards (VSS) which constitute a leading 
example of so-called private standards (Marx et al. 2012). The paper first introduces the emergence, 
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proliferation and importance of VSS. Next, the paper assesses how private standards in VSS. Next, the 
attention turns to the link between public policy and VSS. We end with a conclusion. 
Voluntary Sustainability Standards  
The United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS)
1
 (2013, p. 3) defines VSS as 
“standards specifying requirements that producers, traders, manufacturers, retailers or service 
providers may be asked to meet, relating to a wide range of sustainability metrics, including respect 
for basic human rights, worker health and safety, the environmental impacts of production, community 
relations, land use planning and others.” This collection of voluntary standards2 comprises many 
different initiatives. Although some voluntary systems are governmental, most of them are private 
initiatives. The Ecolabel Index database counts more than 450 initiatives. The international standards 
map of the International Trade Centre counts more than 160. A few examples illustrate the diversity. 
Some initiatives are driven by industry (associations) or NGOs, such as Responsible Care in the 
chemical sector, the charter of employment rights of the clothing giant GAP, or the Clean Clothes 
Campaign, which strives to achieve better terms of employment in textile production plants in 
developing countries. Some initiatives which have generated significant academic interest are non-
state multi-stakeholder sustainability certification initiatives. Among the most prominent and 
representative examples of these private regulatory initiatives are the Fairtrade Labelling Organization 
(FLO), the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Fair Labour Association (FLA), Social 
Accountability International (SAI) and the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). The FLO, established 
in 1997, was founded to enable producers and workers in developing countries to evolve from a 
position of vulnerability to a position of economic security and self-sufficiency. The core of the 
system focuses on the concept of a fair price. The FSC, set up in 1993, is an international, multi-
stakeholder, consensus-based sustainable forestry initiative. It guarantees that a wood or paper product 
has been made using material from a sustainably managed forest. SAI is a non-governmental, 
international, multi-stakeholder and non-profit organization whose mission is to promote the rights of 
workers worldwide and to improve working conditions by applying socially responsible standards. 
The FLA grew out of the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) initiative of the Clinton administration to 
protect workers worldwide and provide firms and consumers with the information they need to make 
informed purchasing decisions. The partnership was composed of apparel and footwear firms, human 
rights groups, labor and religious organizations, and consumer advocates. The FLA now represents a 
multi-stakeholder coalition of business enterprises, colleges and universities, and NGOs (human 
rights, labor, religious and consumer groups). Its mission is to combine the efforts of these 
stakeholders to promote adherence to international labor standards and improve labor rights 
worldwide. GLOBALG.A.P is one of the many, but leading VSS in agriculture and certifies farms 
according to a set of good agricultural practices which include health and safety issues and social and 
environmental issues. A final example is the MSC, which grew out of a partnership between WWF 
and Unilever and which aims to sustainable manage oceans and fisheries. In almost every economic 
sector, VSS are currently active and operate internationally. 
The various initiatives differ from one another. Most initiatives, however, are characterized by the 
fact that an organization defines social and environmental standards and that there is a procedure to 
                                                     
1
 In the spring of 2013 the United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS), a joint initiative by five UN 
agencies (FAO, UNIDO, ITC, UNEP and UNCTAD), was launched. The UNFSS is a platform created to generate 
knowledge and information on voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) with a particular focus on their potential 
contribution to development.  
2
 There is no general agreed upon specific definition of a standard. According to ISO (ISO/IEC Guide 2:1996, definition 
3.2) a standard is “a document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common 
and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the 
optimum degree of order in a given context.”  
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check that products or production processes conform to these standards (i.e. conformity assessment). 
The standard-setting often occurs in specific decision-making bodies within the VSS organisations 
which are (should be) open to multiple stakeholders. This stakeholder involvement might imply that 
special procedures are set in place to involve stakeholders in defining and operationalizing standards. 
These procedures can include the identification of stakeholders via stakeholder mapping; the 
development of a strategy to proactively approach and involve the identified stakeholders; the bringing 
together of several major stakeholders on a more or less equal representative basis in a decision-
making; the opening up of the decision-making process to all interested parties not initially identified 
in the first round of the stakeholder mapping; and the deployment of consensus-based decision making 
in order to ensure that all interests are included. (ISEALALLIANCE, 2010) In essence, any person 
(organization, company, government agency, individual, etc.) with an interest has in principle a right 
to participate in the standard-setting process.  
Once standards are developed VSS put systems in place to assess conformity with standards and 
monitor compliance with standards by rule-takers. In the context of VSS, conformity assessment and 
monitoring are key components since they form the backbone of the enforcement architecture of VSS. 
Monitoring is a control-mechanism which allows for the assessment of the compliance with standards. 
Monitoring in VSS is a function of two interrelated aspects, namely monitoring and the presence of 
complaint systems (Marx & Wouters, forthcoming a). Monitoring refers to the assessment of 
conformity with standards by independent third parties based on auditing protocols. The conformity of 
products and processes to standards must be assessed and demonstrated to gain certification. In order 
to provide assurance that parties which carry out conformity assessments and certification activities 
are fitted for the task, accreditation systems are sometimes put in place. Accreditation aims to 
guarantee that a conformity assessment body is competent to carry out such tasks as auditing and 
inspection, and to come to the right conclusion as to whether a product complies with a defined 
standard. Accredited organizations are often international consultancy firms such as SGS and Bureau 
Veritas (Blair et al. 2008). Hence monitoring involves an independent certification body which 
performs the conformity assessment. With regard to the certification of social and environmental 
standards monitoring/conformity assessment takes the form of auditing sites according to an auditing 
protocol (for a critical discussion see Marx & Wouters, forthcoming a). Auditing systems, however, 
are incomplete for monitoring standards. (Locke, 2013; Marx, 2014a) In order to overcome the 
limitations of monitoring based on auditing, complaint or dispute settlement procedures are set in 
place which allows different stakeholders to constantly monitor and report any violations of standards.  
The emergence of these VSS is sparked by many interrelated factors and the story about their 
emergence is also partially different depending on the commodities covered and the type of VSS. First 
of all, consumers have grown more conscious of social and environmental issues and may adjust their 
purchasing behavior in relation to the perceived sustainability of products. (O’Rourke, 2013). In order 
to cater for this market special points of recognition such as labels, based on VSS, were developed. 
Second, brand protection is a key issue for many leading companies. Changing strategies of NGOs 
which directly target firms through the use of media campaigns and boycotts, have forced firms to take 
civil society concerns into account (Bartley, 2003; Gereffi et al., 2001). This has led firms to engage 
with NGOs and set up VSS. For NGOs this collaboration also offered benefits. Rather than being 
confrontational towards firms or try to influence firm behaviour via lobbying governments, NGO’s are 
using a co-operative strategy towards firms of which VSS are prominent example. As Bartley (2011, 
p. 445) notes “private efforts have also been perceived by many NGO’s as a way to bypass political 
roadblocks”. Thirdly, in some cases government regulation has been a driver of VSS development. 
For example, the UK Food Safety Act of 1990 provided that food retailers had to govern their supply 
chain which resulted in the development of many different VSS, first on the level of individual 
retailers followed by initiatives of consortia of retailers (Henson and Humphrey, 2012). Fourthly, 
many VSS emerged as a reaction to other VSS. For example, NGO driven VSS are sometimes 
countered by industry driven VSS or vice versa. Or several different NGO or industry VSS operate in 
the same market. This dynamic has actually led to a proliferation of VSS in which many competing 
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VSS operate in the same economic sector (Marx & Wouters, forthcoming) Finally, some initiatives 
emerged as empowerment and capacity building initiatives in the global South (Auld et al. 2014). The 
Fair Trade certificates are a good example of this type of VSS. Their emergence has a different logic 
and set of drivers and are more rooted in the tradition of cooperatives and markets for cooperatives. 
After their emergence and proliferation these VSS have spread out globally following the 
internationalization and splintering of production lines and supply chains (Hoekman, 2014, p. 15) 
There is little consolidated data available on the global adoption of VSS. One way to approach this 
question is to analyze which systems are active in which countries. Here one uses the total field of 
VSS as a unit of analysis and assesses the degree to which they are active in a specific country. This 
approach will inform us which VSS are active in which countries. However, it does not tells us much 
about the magnitude of adoption in a specific country of a specific VSS. To analyze how many 
standards are active in a country we collected data from the International Trade Centre standards map 
which contains data on more than 160 standards. Table 1 shows the number of VSS active in a specific 
country and ranks the countries from high (countries with the most number of VSS active) to low 
(countries with the lowest number of VSS active). 
Table 1: Number of VSS per country 
    # VSS 
  # 
VSS 
1 China 79 43 Czech Republic 47 
2 USA 78 44 Greece 47 
3 Brazil 77 45 Ireland 47 
4 India 72 46 Philippines 47 
5 Mexico 71 47 Ghana 45 
6 Canada 70 48 Uganda 45 
7 United Kingdom 70 49 Dominican Rep 44 
8 Netherlands 69 50 New Zealand 44 
9 Germany 67 51 Romania 44 
10 Belgium 65 52 Slovenia 44 
11 Thailand 65 53 Bolivia 43 
12 Colombia 64 54 Bulgaria 43 
13 Indonesia 64 55 Ethiopia 43 
14 Peru 64 56 Latvia 43 
15 Spain 64 57 Morocco 43 
16 Denmark 63 58 Tunisia 43 
17 France 62 59 Madagascar 42 
18 Italy 62 60 Nicaragua 42 
19 South Africa 62 61 Lithuania 41 
20 Viet Nam 60 62 Pakistan 41 
21 Costa Rica 59 63 Singapore 41 
22 Switzerland 59 64 Slovakia 40 
23 Australia 58 65 Zambia 40 
24 Austria 57 66 Estonia 39 
25 Sweden 57 67 Russian Federation 39 
26 Argentina 56 68 Paraguay 38 
27 Ecuador 56 69 Zimbabwe 38 
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28 Turkey 56 70 Croatia 37 
29 Chile 55 71 El Salvador 37 
30 Japan 54 72 Israel 37 
31 Poland 54 73 Uruguay 37 
32 Portugal 53 74 Bangladesh 36 
33 Malaysia 52 75 Cyprus 36 
34 Guatemala 51 76 Mauritius 36 
35 Honduras 51 77 Luxembourg 35 
36 Finland 50 78 Serbia 35 
37 Kenya 50 79 Ukraine 35 
38 Sri Lanka 50 80 Cote d’Ivoire 34 
39 Egypt 49 81 United Arab Emirates 34 
40 Tanzania 49 82 Cambodia 33 
41 Hungary 48 83 Malawi 33 
42 Norway 48 84 Mozambique 32 
85 Cameroon 31 131 Turkmenistan 19 
86 Papua New Guinea 31 132 Fiji 19 
87 Bosnia&Herzegovina 30 133 Gabon 19 
88 Burkina Faso 30 134 Seychelles 18 
89 Senegal 30 135 Barbados 17 
90 Panama 29 136 Kuwait 17 
91 Rwanda 29 137 Lesotho 17 
92 Congo 28 138 Liberia 17 
93 Namibia 28 139 Micronesia, Fed. 17 
94 Venezuela 28 140 Quatar 17 
95 Belize 27 141 Samoa 17 
96 Laos 27 142 Timor-Leste 17 
97 Lebanon 27 143 Antigua&Baburda 16 
98 Saoudi Arabia 26 144 Bahamas 16 
99 Kazakstan 26 145 Brunei Darussalam 16 
100 Mali 26 146 Central African Republic 16 
101 TFRY Macedonia 26 147 Dominica 16 
102 Albania 25 148 Grenada 16 
103 Iceland 24 149 Guinea-Bissau 16 
104 Oman 24 150 Kyrgystan 16 
105 Suriname 24 151 Mauritania 16 
106 Togo 24 152 Tajikistan 16 
107 Algeria 23 153 Vanuatu 16 
108 Swaziland 23 154 Yemen 16 
109 Bahrein 22 155 Sierra Leone 15 
110 Georgia 22 156 Djibouti 14 
111 Myanmar 22 157 Iraq 14 
112 Niger 22 158 Kiribati 14 
113 Trinidad and Tobago 22 159 Maldives 14 
114 Azerbaijan 21 160 Somalia 14 
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115 Benin 21 161 Andorra 13 
116 Botswana 21 162 St Vincent and Grenadines 13 
117 Burundi 21 163 Cape Verde 13 
118 Guinea 21 164 Chad 13 
119 Iran 21 165 Comoros 13 
120 Syrian Arab Republic 21 166 Equatorial Guinea 13 
121 Afghanistan 20 167 Libyan Arab 13 
122 Armenia 20 168 New Caladonia 13 
123 Cuba 20 169 Palau 13 
124 Gambia 20 170 Bhutan 12 
125 Guyana 20 171 Eritrea 12 
126 Uzbekistan 20 172 Sao Tome Principe 12 
127 Angola 19    
128 Korea DPR 19    
129 Solomon Islands 19    
130 Sudan 19    
The table reveals a few interesting observations. First of all, VSS are active in almost every country in 
the world. Mostly missing are very small islands states or rough states such as North Korea. In 
general, VSS cover the world. Second, there is significant variation between states. Some states are 
VSS hotspots with many VSS active, while in other only a few ones are active. The countries with 
many VSS active are typically large industrialized countries but there are also some exceptions and 
some Middle Income Countries rank remarkably high (Colombia, Peru, Thailand).  
Besides their global reach VSS generate a diverse set of effects which are becoming increasingly 
well documented. Several studies have documented a plethora of impacts. Often studies focus on 
specific VSS in specific countries. Overall one can identify many types of impacts, both positive as 
well as negative and intended and some unintended. A large number of impact studies focus on 
parameters related to profitability and economic benefits, including price premiums gained by 
participating in VSS, increase in yield, quality or net income as well as costs incurred and finally 
market access (ITC 2011a, b, FAO, 2014). Some studies, specifically focus on organizational change 
and innovation generated by VSS (Moore et al, 2012; Cubbage et al. 2010, Duchelle et al, 2014) 
Besides impact on economic benefits some studies report social impacts on wages (SOAS, 2014), 
gender equity (Greenwich and ITC), health and education (Nelson and Martin, 2014), empowerment 
(Wiersum et al. 2013; Quaedvlieg et al. 2014; for a more critical perspective on the empowerment 
potential of VSS see Pinto and McDermott, 2013), social capital (Tsanga et al. 2014; Murphy and 
Lawhon, 2011) and labour conditions (for a review and critical discussion see Locke 2013; Marx and 
Wouters, 2015) 
In sum, VSS are an important transnational governance tool in the context of sustainable 
development with a global reach. As a result, they regulate economic activity transnationally on a 
range of social and environmental issues. Their regulatory activities affect economic actors throughout 
the supply chain and generate an impact on trade patterns. Although some of these initiatives are 
governmental, though voluntary, in nature most of them are private. However, how useful is it to 
categorize them as private? In the next sections we explore this question and argue that the distinction 
between private and public is not straightforward. There is no distinct public sphere of regulation or 
private sphere of regulation. They, to a certain degree overlap and standards move from public intro 
private spheres and back again. We substantiate this argument by looking at two units of analysis, the 
standards and policies pursued by governments. 
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How Private are Private Standards? 
First, on the level of the standards themselves the distinction between private and public fades because 
standards typically ‘travel’ between private and public spheres. Before we elaborate this it is important 
to note that standards have different levels of precision in the context of VSS. In VSS standards are 
typically nested in which you first find general ‘standards’ or principles which then are further 
specified into specific indicators which can be measured. The latter is necessary in the context of audit 
protocols which are one of the main monitoring instruments. For example, the Fair Labour Association 
has a code of conduct which consists of nine standards: employment relationship, nondiscrimination, 
harassment of abuse, forced labor, child labor, freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
health, safety and environment, hours of work and compensation. These standards are then subdivided 
in many more specific standards. For example, for compensation there are 19 sub-standards such as 
standards on pay statement or minimum wage which are in turn subdivided in another set of even 
more specific standards which in addition can vary between countries.  
If one looks at the level of standards one can observe that many ‘private’ standards actually heavily 
rely and incorporate ‘public’ rules and standards. Many private standards integrate existing 
international rules and agreements, often developed in a multilateral context in their set of rules and 
standards. Often these international rules and standards have been ratified by countries and are 
incorporated in national legislation. In this way, they integrate public rules and standards in a private 
set of procedures. Take the example of the Forest Steward Council which bases its transnational 
regulatory on ten general standards of which two explicitly refer to public international law. The first 
FSC rule requires that standard-takers comply with all laws, regulations, treaties, conventions and 
agreements. This means that the standards which are developed in the context of the FSC should 
adhere to provisions included in inter alia the Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life 
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES), Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCED), Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, (UNCED) and International Tropical Timber Agreement (see Marx et al. 2012). Principle 4 
of the FSC refers to worker’s rights and the conventions by the ILO including the 1998 Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. This Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work covers the core rights and standards laid down in four principles and eight conventions. These 
principles are (1) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining, (2) elimination of all forms of forces or compulsory labor, (3) effective abolition of child 
labor and (4) elimination of discrimination and respect of employment and occupation. This 
Declaration is universal and in principle applies to all states. States which have not ratified one or 
more of the conventions have to report on actions taken towards ratification. 
This reliance on existing international agreements and conventions can actually imply that some 
international agreements are enforced in countries which have not ratified them such as for example 
the United States with regard to the Convention on Biological Diversity or other countries which have 
not ratified ILO conventions. In this way, VSS sometimes bypass sovereign states and enforce 
international rules domestically. 
VSS do not only enforce public international law but also closely interact with national legislation. 
Basso et al. (2011, see also Basso et al. 2012) analyze the interaction between VSS and the 
enforcement of existing national (Brazilian) legislation. They start with the observation that Brazil has 
fairly elaborated and complete environmental and labor legislation, but is confronted with difficulties 
of effective enforcement. The study aimed to determine the contribution of private forest certification 
to strengthen compliance with environmental legislation in the management forest units of plantations. 
They analyzed the degree to which certified entities complied with existing legislation. Overall, they 
found that certified forests better comply with national legislation which could be expected on the 
grounds that FSC integrates existing national legislation in its standard-setting and standard-
enforcement procedures. They also found some non-compliances which were related to environmental 
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and labor legislation. The non-conformance in relation to environmental legislation was mostly related 
to problems with the Permanent Preservation Areas legislation and the Legal Reserve requirements in 
Brazilian law. Also in relation to labor legislation they reported non-compliance with regulatory norms 
concerning health and safety at work. However, they also noted that the certification process did spot 
these non-compliances and required corrective actions in order to maintain certification. This study 
shows that VSS contributes to the further enforcement of existing national legislation in forest 
management units and that also public national legislation is integrated in private standards. 
What this shows is that many of these standards are embedded in national or international 
legislation. In this way, government or intergovernmental regulation forms the framework in which 
the private standard-setting process takes place. What emerges is not so much a difference between 
public and private but a standard-setting process in which private actors further operationalize and 
refine public standards. This does not preclude that in some cases this interpretation and 
transformation of standards feeds back into the public regulatory framework such as in the case of 
organic regulation (see Winickoff and Klein, 2011). Regulatory governance scholars have for long 
recognized that standard-setting is a highly political process in which not only governmental actors 
play a role but many non-governmental ones. (Majone, 1998). In addition, standards are not made in 
one regulatory arena but in several. Ansell and Balsiger (2011, p. 181) refer to the idea of circuits of 
regulation which captures the idea that regulation takes place through the interaction of separate but 
overlapping regulatory arenas. These circuits have a horizontal (travelling between regulatory arenas, 
public and private ones) and vertical dimension (travelling between levels of governance). In the case 
of VSS the overarching standards often originate from public legislation and then get further specified 
through a process of private decision-making. In this way, many of the standards in VSS are certainly 
not entirely private. 
Public Policy and Private Standards: two separate worlds?  
VSS also interact in many ways with governmental policy. Several efforts have been undertaken to 
categorize the different measures through which public authorities interact with VSS (Wood 2003, 
2005; Vermeulen et al., 2011; Bendell et al., 2011; Carey and Guttenstein, 2008). These typologies 
reflect the diverse possibilities of interaction and indicate that government actions are often 
instrumental in stimulating and promoting the adoption of VSS. The support of governments for VSS 
has been documented in several occasions. Both in setting up VSS and promoting adoption 
governments, or government agencies, have played and still play a role. Governments have been 
instrumental in setting up VSS schemes. In the forest sector governments have supported the creation 
of VSS programs (Cashore et al. 2004; Cashore et al. 2005). The Malaysian government recently 
supported the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil certification scheme (Scharma, 2013) which is a 
competitor to the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil. International Sustainability and Carbon 
Certification was developed with support from the German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Consumer Protection, while the process leading to the setting of the Netherland Technical Agreement 
(NTA) 8080 was supported by the Dutch government. Van der Heijden (2015) analyzed 40 voluntary 
environmental programmes (VEPs) which are active in the building sector in Australia, the 
Netherlands, Singapore and the United States. Many of these VEPS could be considered VSS for the 
building sector. He finds that governments are involved in almost all of these VEPs (95 per cent) and 
take up a diversity of roles but most importantly the role of initiating and setting up VEPs. 
Also in fostering adoption governments provide incentives and in the case of developing countries 
financial and technical assistance. One can find many examples of international donors engaging with 
VSS. At present, international donors such as DIFID, USAID, World Bank, Belgian Technical 
Cooperation, GIZ, provide financial as well as technical support to various VSS setting bodies such as 
Fairtrade, Global Gap, Rainforest Alliance and UTZ. Examples include the support of 4C by Flemish 
International Cooperation Agency; the Cotton Initiative by Swedish Development Cooperation, 
Ethical Tea Partnership by Danish Development cooperation and GiZ; Fair Trade by a host of donors 
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including Belgian development cooperation, DFID, Irish Aid, Norwegian Development Cooperation, 
GiZ, and Agence Française de développement; GlobalGAP by GiZ; Rainforest Alliance by US AID 
and UTZ certified by Irish Aid. In some cases specific programs are developed to further support the 
adoption of VSS such as European Banana Support Programme in Jamaica. This is a 3.5MEUR 
investment in rural development in Jamaica in order to improve the competitiveness of the banana 
industry. Under this programme several projects have been financed which support Jamaican farmers 
to comply with VSS such as Global Gap and Fair trade. Many other donors are taking similar 
initiatives. 
However, more significant from a regulatory or policy perspective, VSS are increasingly becoming 
part of regulatory actions of governments. If one shifts the lens to public policy-making and 
governance arrangements as a unit of analysis one can observe that VSS in several instances 
complement public policy strategies and constitute an inherent part of public policy arrangements. In 
other words, the shift from government to governance (Mavroidis and Wolfe this volume) not only 
implies that other actors involved in the regulatory or governance process but that governments on 
purpose or in the design of governance take these private initiatives on board. Hence, they become an 
integral part of ‘public’ governance. This happens in several ways.  
Public Procurement Policies 
One way in which VSS are integrated in legislation and policies is through sustainable public 
procurement (SPP) policies. SPP is an increasingly widespread practice that has been consolidated in 
policy frameworks at several institutional levels, particularly in Europe. Analyzing SPP frameworks 
provides insight in governments’ expectations towards VSS. In this sense, Gulbrandsen notes that the 
potential of VSS depends on ‘how and whether they will act synergistically with government rules,’ 
(Gulbrandsen, 2012, p. 17). Given the large quantity of their purchases the impact of the integration of 
VSS in SPP is potentially vast. (OECD, 2008) In most countries, the share of public procurement 
represents anything between 10% to 25% of Gross Domestic Product (UNEP, 2011). SPP practices 
include public authorities demanding that wood products are manufactured from legally harvested or 
sustainable timber, that public buildings meet ecological standards, that clothing for state employees is 
made in a healthy and childfree labor environment, or that coffee served is produced in fair conditions.  
The elaboration of SPP policies does not imply a straightforward adoption of VSS by governments. 
In the majority of legal frameworks for public procurement, the principle of equal treatment and non-
discrimination prohibits contracting authorities to choose or prefer a trademark or label. This would 
imply discrimination as it means excluding certified products and services without the preferred 
certificate. Hence, demanding that goods or services are certified by a specific VSS is prohibited 
within for example the EU framework for public procurement (European Commission, 2010). 
However, the use of VSS in SPP is indirect: through (a) the integration of VSS sustainability criteria 
into public tenders (ie operationalized private standards flow back into public tenders); or (b) the 
referencing of VSS as a ‘proof of compliance’ in public tenders.  
Concerning (a), when including environmental and social dimensions in SPP, contracting 
authorities have often relied on the sustainability criteria developed by VSS. (D’Hollander & Marx, 
2014) Several European governments have elaborated SPP guidance instruments for procurement 
officers, which identify the environmental, social and ethical criteria that can be included in a public 
tender. These tools transpose the specifications or criteria developed by VSS into a set of national 
criteria in order to streamline the use of SPP and avoid litigation. To ensure these requirements are not 
too narrow or ‘VSS-specific’ (i.e. discriminatory), government agencies in a number of EU countries 
have established layered criteria-setting processes for different product groups. Through these 
processes, government agencies aim to adapt the national sustainability criteria to the availability of 
sustainable/certified products and services in the domestic market. Such processes are often led or 
complemented by stakeholder consultations, which bring together representatives from the private 
Axel Marx 
10 
sector, NGOs, government officials, and academics. For specific sectors, notably timber-related 
products, national centres of expertise have been established to assist government bodies in defining 
adequate criteria and evaluating or benchmarking VSS performance. These government bodies 
accredit certain VSS and exclude other VSS for government purposes. Examples are the UK’s Central 
Point of Expertise on Timber (CPET) and the Timber Procurement Assessment Committee (TPAC) in 
the Netherlands.  
Concerning (b), in daily procurement practice, VSS serve as proof (indicators) of social and 
environmental performance and are used as shorthand to assess the bidder’s credentials. As noted 
before, demanding a specific VSS is not possible within the legal frameworks, but contracting 
authorities do have a certain degree of flexibility by referring to particular certification schemes as a 
non-exclusive proof of compliance. Interesting in this context are the debates concerning the 
integration of fair trade criteria in public tenders. This has long remained a point of contention, 
illustrated by the case brought before the European Court of Justice between the Commission and The 
Netherlands concerning specific references to the criteria of the EKO label and the Max Havelaar 
Label in a public tender issued by the Province of Groningen (ECJ, 2012). The ECJ’s ruling confirmed 
fair trade principles, and a reference to labels, can be included in public tenders as an award criterium. 
The integration of VSS criteria into SPP frameworks can be seen as the internalization of ‘privately 
developed’ standards and criteria by governments. The use of VSS as proof of compliance can be 
considered a direct form of how public authorities use VSS as verification mechanisms in procurement 
activities. SPP policies exemplify how governments “combine public sector regulation with private 
sector standard setting to arrive at a mixed regulatory regime,” (Bendell, 2011, p. 38). It should be 
noted that the integration of VSS in SPP influences also the procedures and functioning of VSS. 
According to Overdevest (2010), SPP policies used by governments effectively stimulate greater 
transparency and performance in the forestry certification sector. Gulbrandsen (2012) also shows how 
the initial non-approval of certain forestry schemes by the UK’s Central Point of Expertise on Timber 
(CPET) has led these schemes to reform and adjust their internal functioning in line with the 
demanded requirements. Public assessments carried out in the framework of SPP policy contributed to 
an upward harmonization of the institutional design of the different national PEFC schemes 
(Gulbrandsen, 2012, p. 11).  
Integration of VSS in Regulatory Processes 
Policy initiatives also integrate VSS in the design of regulatory processes and public policies. One 
case in point is the EU Timber regulation (EU Regulation 995/2010) on the prohibition of selling 
illegally harvested timber on the European market. According to this regulation importers of timber 
products must provide proof that the timber was legally harvested, that is, attestation that the forest 
products originate from legally harvested forests (ie legality verification). Being certified according to 
a forest-related VSS does not automatically imply that you comply with regulation or as evidence of 
legality. The EU timber regulation requires that operators need to have a due diligence system in place 
which consists of three elements, information, risk assessment and risk mitigation. A due diligence 
system can be developed by a company or a recognized ‘monitoring instrument’. Currently, the 
Commission has recognized a limited number of monitoring organisations. They include the typical 
certifiers such as Bureau Veritas, SGS UK and NEPCon. However, VSS play a key role in this due 
diligence system, especially in steps 2 (risk assessment) and 3 (risk mitigation). Article 4 of the 
regulation on risk assessment and risk mitigation stipulates that “Certification or other third-party 
verified schemes […] may be taken into account in the risk assessment and risk mitigation 
procedures”. 
In other words, the fact that an operator is certified by a VSS does not mean that a due diligence 
system is not required. However, VSS provide a way to fulfil parts of the due diligence requirements 
of the EU regulation (ie proof of compliance). For example, NEPCon one of the recognized 
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monitoring organisations by the European Commission, has developed a LegalSource standard and 
due diligence guidelines to assess and verify an operator (timber importer). Part of this standard and 
set of guidelines address the due diligence part of risk assessment and mitigation. If the risk 
assessment identifies a negligible risk (lowest level of risk) no further action is required and an 
operator complies. The NEPCon documents clearly recognize FSC as a VSS as part of risk assessment 
and mitigation. (NEPCon Legal Source Document 2013) This recognition of FSC certification shows 
the ‘competitive’ advantage of being certified in order to fulfil the requirements of the EUTR. Hence, 
in the case of EUTR there is a nested private standards requirement in which private actors assess due 
diligence of operators on the basis of private standards and guidelines on legality which in turn refer to 
private standards (VSS) to address elements of the due diligence system of an operator.  
However, in some cases the integration of VSS in legislation is more direct and legislation directly 
recognizes VSS. For example of the 2009 EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED) (2009/28/EC) and 
the EU Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) (2009/30/EC). RED requires 20 per cent of energy use in the EU 
to come from renewable sources by 2020, while FED obliges suppliers of fossil fuel to gradually 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Under RED, the Commission set up an accreditation systems for 
voluntary standards in order to proof compliance of biofuel providers with the directive. The list 
currently comprises 19 VSS including inter alia International Sustainability and Carbon Certification, 
BonSucro, Round Table on Responsible Soy, Roundtable of Sustainable Biofuels, Red Tractor and 
Roundtable on sustainable Palm Oil (European Commission, 2015). As Ponte and Daugbjerg (2015) 
and Schleifer (2013) point out this type of hybrid governance is based on deep and mutual dependence 
and interconnection between public and private elements.  
The integration of VSS in public policies can be expected to further develop, especially in the 
context of trade related policies and an expanding ‘governance through trade agenda’ (Nicoïladis and 
Meunier, 2006; Damro, 2012). There are already some who advocate the integration of sustainability 
standards in the EU Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme. In a report by the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development on ‘Tariff preferences for sustainable products: an 
examination of the potential role of sustainability standards in generalized preference systems based 
on the European model (GSP)’ proposals are being put forward to further support the adoption of VSS 
through a system of state recognition and the extension of the existing trade policy tools for 
sustainable development (Schukat et al. 2014, p. 420) 
The GSP of the EU makes preferential market access conditional upon adherence to specific 
norms. GSP is a set of rules granting preferential EU market access to exporters from developing 
countries through lower duties on some or all of their exports to the EU. In October 2012, EU 
Regulation 978/2012 updated the Union’s GSP Scheme with the following objectives: to focus help on 
those countries truly in need; to strengthen the incentives for good governance and sustainable 
development known as ‘GSP+’; and to make the scheme more transparent, stable and predictable. The 
current system of GSP consists of three parts: (1) the standard GSP which benefits 176 countries, 
GSP+ (special incentives for sustainable development and good governance) which grants additional 
preferences to currently 16 countries which inter alia have ratified and implemented 27 international 
conventions and the Everything but Arms Programme for the 50 least developed countries. The 
possible integration of VSS in GSP would further mix-in VSS in trade-related policies. 
However, not only the EU is integrating VSS in trade policies. Many developing countries and 
middle-income countries are recognizing VSS in trade policies. In a speech in The Hague Jamaica’s 
Minister of Agriculture, Labour and Social Security, stated that GLOBALG.A.P. certification is from 
2015 a requirement for all Jamaican farmers wishing to export their fresh produce to Europe. This is a 
part of the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011. In addition, the Jamaican government is planning 
to spend some $100 million in the 2015/16 financial year to support certification and promote export. 
[GLOBALGAP Newsletter]. Or take the example of Vietnam. As Putzel (2012) shows the Vietnamese 
government has, since 1992, implemented far reaching policies and programs to increase the country's 
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tree cover by promoting plantation forestry inter alia to promote export, provide environmental 
services and alleviate rural poverty. This policy was set against a background of promoting sustainable 
forestry. More than 4 million ha of forests were assigned to households and rural cooperatives through 
forestland reallocation or management contracts. The idea was to involve these households and 
cooperatives in timber based supply chains. In addition, in the last decade, with Vietnam's economic 
liberalisation policies, the timber processing industry has shifted from State-owned enterprises to 
private companies. By 2008, the timber processing sector had expanded into a $3 billion industry, one 
of Vietnam's top live export sectors and a major source of demand for logs and sawnwood. In this 
context several small forest owners were seeking FSC certification to enter timber supply chains and 
access export markets, aided by several public and private donors including the Vietnamese 
government and Worldbank. Hoang et al (2015) assessed these policies. They show that FSC has 
brought new opportunities, such as price premiums, access to trade networks and markets, but that this 
was only possible through government support for the adoption of standards. Hoang et al. (2015) 
clearly show that there is a heavy dependency on and involvement of the government (and other 
donors) in adopting VSS. This example shows how governments make adoption of VSS a component 
of their industrial (and export oriented) policies. 
In a broader scheme of things, what do these examples tell us? What drives this integration of 
private standards into public policy is fourfold. One is a movement towards the regulatory 
operationalization of due diligence requirements. Due diligence requirements in legislation were 
introduced in the food sector following several food crises. The food crises showed that markets had 
become increasingly globalized which leads to difficulties in tracing the origins of such products. As a 
result, it had become much more difficult for single governments to keep track of the range of 
products present on their domestic markets, and to keep up with the assessment of all the risks 
associated therewith. As a result, governments changed their regulatory approach in which 
supermarkets bear a specific responsibility As the final link between the food producer and the 
consumer supermarkets bear a default responsibility for the entire food. As a result they had to 
develop standards and tracking system throughout their supply chain. An early example of such 
regulatory design is the due diligence requirement contained in the UK Food Safety Act (UKFSA) of 
1990, which provides that food retailers can escape liability for non-compliance with food safety laws 
if they can demonstrate that they have taken all precautions in this regard. The possibility of being 
held liable for food safety issues did prompt a response from the food industry, resulting in the 
development of many different VSS (Henson, 2008; Food and Agriculture Organization, 2007). 
Mirroring the UKFSA, the EU Food Law Regulation of 2002 also provides for a quite stringent 
responsibility threshold for commercial actors involved with food products. This regulatory approach, 
which outsources risk assessment, risk mitigation, monitoring and reporting, is diffusing. Due 
diligence requirements are becoming more widespread and take a diversity of forms such as imposing 
a due diligence requirement as a matter of regulatory compliance or as part of transparency 
requirement. De Schutter et al (2012) found more than 100 examples of due diligence regimes in more 
than 20 countries. In many cases, VSS act as proof of due diligence measures.  
Second, governments, in an interconnected world, have increasingly to govern behind their borders 
and govern through trade as noted above (Meunier and Nicolaïdis, 2006). In the case of biofuels the 
EU needs VSS to reach beyond its borders. The fact that sustainability cannot be observed in products 
when they cross the EU border, but are largely based on production process characteristics means that 
sustainability has to be assess at the place of production. (Ponte and Daugbjerg, 2015) Since VSS 
provide this type of monitoring and assessment capacity they offer a regulatory service which is absent 
for the EU. In this way, they a close regulatory gap which cannot be closed by a government itself. 
They enable governments to transcend the scope of their national regulatory capacities and work 
towards global sustainability goals. VSS do not only set standards, but more importantly also enforce 
(monitoring and sanctioning) them and hence provide capacity to enforce regulation. In this way they 
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solve a major governance problems for sovereign states, namely the issue of monitoring and 
sanctioning.
3
 
Third, VSS are becoming important tools in export promotion. Given the enormous increase in 
international trade over the last five decades (30 fold increase according to Hoekman, 2014) and the 
importance of export for economic development several governments have developed policies which 
link VSS to export promotion as is illustrated by the cases of Jamaica and Vietnam. This integration of 
VSS in export promotion policies can be expected to further develop and diffuse.  
Finally, VSS offer some other advantages. First, they allow governments to reach policy objectives 
without having to commit additional costs and resources to reforming the national regulatory 
framework and setting up the necessary verification mechanisms. VSS become a budget-neutral 
improvement and essential component of regulatory action (Bendell et al., 2011). Second, they allow 
governments to bring social and environmental criteria into the economy without forcing them on the 
private sector but gradually introducing them and gradually making them semi-voluntary or mandatory 
in time through supportive policies. VSS allow governments the flexibility to play in the dynamic 
space between hard law and soft law, mandatory and voluntary regulation (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004) 
and create a dynamic whereby actors continuously create policy learning and possibly a ratcheting up 
of standards (Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2012). Third, the increasing proliferation, specialization and 
diversification of VSS allow governments to better meet the differing sectoral and regional demands 
and hence allow for more tailor-made approaches suitable to standard-takers. The significant number 
of accredited VSS under the Biofuel directive (19 in total -see above) shows that the European 
Commission wants to use the diversity of VSS in their regulatory approach. Fourth, VSS offer the 
potential to promote leaders and sanction non-compliance of standard-takers without using far-ranging 
measures which would hurt an entire sector or economy (suspension under GSP or trade sanctions 
under a trade agreement) (Schukat et al. 2014).  
In sum, VSS complement existing policies in several ways and are becoming an intrinsic part of 
policy approaches. In this way they blend purposefully into different governance arrangements and 
policy mixes. Lambin et al. (2014), looking at land use policies, provide many detailed examples of 
this blending. The different policy instruments they identify for land use planning are public command 
and control regulation, payments for environmental services, moratoria, eco-certification, commodity 
roundtables and geographical indications. The latter three fall under the broad category of VSS. Each 
of these policy instruments has a different target unit (area, commodity or a combination), policy 
mechanism (mandatory rules, incentives, market exclusion) and enforcement (surveillance and 
auditing). They argue that land use is increasingly regulated through various mixes of these policy 
instruments leading to hybrid forms of governance. Similar arguments are put forward by researchers 
focusing on transnational business governance. Eberlein et al. (2013) also observe a proliferation of 
non-state regulatory approaches to business conduct, including VSS, and note that they increasingly 
interact with one another but also with state-based regimes and regulatory approaches. In other words, 
VSS are (becoming) an integral part of public policies making it very difficult to distinguish public 
from private. 
Conclusion 
VSS are regarded as having passed the ‘proof of concept’ phase (UNCTAD, 2011) and now have a 
considerable degree of credibility as a governance instrument. The latter is also partially a result from 
the fact that they gain legitimacy by relying on a set of public international standards and international 
rules. They also constitute an interesting case study to assess the public-private distinction in the 
context of standard-setting since they are a leading example of private standard-setting.  
                                                     
3
 This is not to argue that there are no problems with monitoring formats of VSS which are based on auditing approaches. 
For a discussion see Marx and Wouters (2015). 
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The above discussion shows that the distinction between public and private standards, from a 
regulatory or policy perspective, is not very relevant if one does not solely focus on the legal status of 
an organization involved in standard-setting and enforcement. Public and private increasingly ‘co-
regulate’ (Schukat et al., 2014), forms hybrid forms of governance (Schleifer, 2013; Ponte and 
Daugbjerg, 2015), complement and supplement each other (Lambin et al. 2014) and interact with one 
another (Eberlein et al, 2013; Bendell, et al, 2011). In addition, these private standards integrate to a 
degree international and national public legislation. The trends outlined above will continue to 
develop. This in a context of a proliferating and diversifying field of VSS in which VSS differ 
significantly in how they are designed and operate ranging from ‘greenwash’ types of initiatives to 
elaborated regulatory mechanisms with clear rules and procedures on standard-setting, conformity 
assessment, transparency and dispute settlement. (Marx, 2014; 2014a) A key issue will become on 
how to formally and legally recognize or even regulate VSS. In this context some interesting 
developments are unfolding such as the formal recognition of VSS under the renewable energy 
directive of the European Commission and governmental-led but independent committees evaluating 
VSS in the context of public policies such as the Timber Procurement Assessment Committee of the 
Netherlands. This move towards formal recognition of VSS will also continue to develop. Such a 
formal recognition, based on at least the content of standards (embedded in international and national 
legislation) and the process of certification (ie system requirements concerning accreditation and 
certification processes (ISO standards, WTO TBT Code of Good Practice and ISEAL Codes of Good 
Practice)) will contribute to a further integration of VSS in public policies making the public-private 
distinction oblivious.  
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